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One thing that continues to attract people to Kierkegaard's 
writings is his inexhaustible literary creativity. Unlike many 
thinkers, he does not express his philosophical insights in straight­
forward academic prose. He delivers them to us under pseudonyms, 
through narratives, and in an ironic or humorous style. Even in his 
seemingly straightforward works, we find trickery and "profound 
deception."1
Part of what makes Kierkegaard's literary style of philosophical 
interest is the theory that lies behind it, his so-called "theory of 
indirect communication." The most exciting and provocative aspect 
of the theory concerns the alleged importance of indirect communi­
cation. In several places throughout Kierkegaard1 s writings we find 
the claim that there are some ends only indirect communication can 
accomplish - a claim not meant to entail the guaranteed success of 
indirect communication, only its ability to do what direct communi­
cation cannot. For example, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to "Philosophical Fragments," the pseudonym Johannes Climacus claims 
that any attempt to cormnunicate subjectivity or inwardness must 
make use of an indirect form (CUP, 1:79, 242, 325). In The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard himself argues that an 
,, illusion" can only be removed through indirect communication 
(PV, 43, 54). And in Works of Love he maintains that indirect commu­
nication is necessary for helping a loved one achieve what is most 
beneficial for him or her (WL, 274). Finally, in Practice in Christianity, 
the pseudonym Anti-Climacus argues that it is impossible for Christ 
to save all of humanity without employing indirect communication 1George Pattison, Ki�rkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses (New York: Routledge, 
2002) 21. See also Pattison, "The Theory and Practice of Language and Communica­
tion in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses," Kierkegaardiana 19 (1998): 85-87. 
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(PC1 941 123-44).2 I will call the general clai1n contained in these
passages 11 the indispensability thesis. 11 
Several commentators have objected that Kierkegaard' 8
acceptance of the indispensability thesis is not rationally justified. e, 
Stephen Evans1 for example/ claims that Kierkegaard sin1ply 
exaggerates the need for indirect cominunication.3 Harry Broudy
questions whether the failure of direct conununication is really as 
inevitable as Kierkegaard makes it sound.4 Finally/ Walter Lowrie
goes so far as to suggest that Kierkegaard resorts to indfrect c01nmu­
njcation simply because of his deep1 personal n1elancholy. 5
The purpose of this paper is to take a close/ analytic look at Kier­
kegaard1 s justification of the indispensability thesis. To this end, I 
will carefully reconstruct two of the main arguments he offers in 
defense of it, both of which take their departure from The Point of View. The first is that he needs to use indirect co1nmunication to 
discourage people from losing themselves in the "crowd. 11 The 
second is that he needs to use indirect con1munication to help people 
out of a 1'monstrous illusion. 11 I do not pretend that these two
arguments exhaust everything Kierkegaard has to say in defense of 
the indispensability thesis. We certainly find in his writings other 
interesting reasons why he needs to use indirect co1n1nunication for 
other important purposes. Investigating these reasons would be 
worthwhile. Nevertheless, the two argu1nents I have mentioned are 
intriguing in their own right and, I think, can be understood in isola­
tion. They will be the sole focus of my paper. 
2It is worth noting that we sometimes find weaker claims in Kierkegaard's 
writings concerning the importance of indirect communication. E.g., in Stnges on 
Life's Way the pseudonymous Quidam suggests that indirect communication is the 
best way-but not necessarily the only way- to prevent someone from becoming 
a thoughtless follower (SLW, 344). 3C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and ''Postscript": T'1e Religious
Philosophy of Johnnnes Climacus (Amherst NY: Humanity Books, 1983) 111-12. 
4Harry S. Broudy, "Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication," The Journal of 
Philosophy 59/9 (1961): 230. See also Vanessa Rumble, "To Be as No-One: Kierke­
gaard and Climacus on the Art of Indirect Communication," J11ternntio11nl Journlll of 
Philosophical Studies 3/2 (1995): 311, 313-14. 
5S0ren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity nnd the Edifying Discourse Which 
Acco111pa11ied It, trans. Walter Lowrie (PrincetonNJ:.Princeton University Press, 1964) 
96nl. 
The Point of VieuJ 297 My conclusion regarding these two arguments will be moderate in nature. On the one hand, they establish that indirect communica­tion is useful for the stated purposes and indeed much more so than direct communication. Therefore, it is wrong to say that Kierkegaard resorts to it simply because of his deep, personal melancholy. On the other hand, the arguments do not establish that indirect communica­tion is necessary for the stated purposes or that it is the only mecha­nism for accomplishing them. Therefore, the arguments do not support the indispensability thesis and the charge of exaggeration has some merit. Kierkegaard's Two Notions of Indirect Comniunication Before turning to the arguments for the indispensability thesis, we must address a preliminary question: what does Kierkegaard mean by the term" indirect communication"? The unfortunate truth is that it is not altogether clear. Kierkegaard never provides us with a coherent definition, only a number of disjointed discussions of the topic.6 Nevertheless, I believe that we can organize his comments in a productive manner. In this section I will attempt to do so. My account will pull from a variety of Kierkegaard's writings, both pseudonymous and signed. This begs the notorious question regarding how to treat the pseudonymous texts. Kierkegaard famously requests that we not attribute to him the views found in them (CUP, 1:(627]). I will adopt the following response to this request.We must distinguish between two notions of attribution. On the one hand, to attribute a view to me can simply mean that I came 
6This fact has led some to claim that Kierkegaard does not have a coherent 
theory of indirect communication. See Benjamin Daise, Kierkegaard's Socratic Art 
(Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1999) 30; and Poul Liibcke, "Kierkegaard and 
Indirect Communication," History of European Ideas 12/1 (1990): 32. It has led others 
to claim that the phrase "indirect communication" is an honorific term, one that 
refers to any kind of communication that Kierkegaard deems important. See Lars 
Bejerholm, Meddelelsens Dialektik: Studier i S0ren Kierkegaards Tearier om Sprdk, Kommunikation och Pseudonymitet (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1962) 208-209, 311. 
Part of the problem here is that Kierkegaard has hesitations about communicating 
directly about indirect communication. For a discussion of this issue, see Antony 
Aumann, "Kierkegaard on the Need for Indirect Communication'' (PhD diss., 
Indiana University, 2008) 25-29. 
298 International J(_jerkegaard Commentary up with it. This is a matter of giving me credit for an original idea oran original way of putting an idea. On the other hand, to attribute aview to me can involve the further claim that I actually believe it. This is a matter of identifying where I stand on a particular issue. Notice that it is possible to make the former kind of attribution without making the latter. For example1 I can attribute to my colleague a powerful way of presenting a position that I a1n not sure he or she ultin1.ately believes. This is the attitude I will take up regarding Kierkegaard's pseudony1nous texts. I will assert that Kierkegaard came up with the views found in them but deny that they necessarily represent his own opinions.7Some people might object that projects such as mine suffer from a special, heightened version of the problem posed by the pseudonyms. I ain1 to develop a Kierkegaardian theory by pulling from a number of different pseudony1nous texts. This practice, some n1ight say, is akin to piecing together words from the mouths of so n1any characters in Shakespeare's plays. It does violence to the differences between the worldviews that the various characters occupy; it homogenizes what is in fact heterogeneous. While I concede there is a potential proble.1n here, I fail to see why it necessarily arises. Kierkegaard's pseudonyms do indeed occupy different lifeviews. However, we cannot say a priori that these life­views are incomn1ensurable on every point. It is possible at least in principle that they agree on son1e topics. To settle the n1atter, we must do the difficult work of digging through the texts, finding the positions articulated by the different pseudonyms, and examining whether they fit together. If we find a coherent view, then the prac­tice of piecing together passages from different pseudonymous texts is legitimate. If we fiµd incoherence and contradiction, then it is not. As for the case in point, I believe that when we do the requisite work with respect to the topic of indirect c01nn1unication we find a coher­ent set of views. The following is my account of those views. There are basically two ways in which Kierkegaard talks about 
7T am not alone in taking up this response to Kierkegaard's request. For others 
who adopt it or something like it, see Steven M. Emmanuel, "Reading Kierkegaard," Pliilosopliy Today36/3 (1992): 241; Evans, Kicrkegnard's "Frag111c11ts" and "Postscript," 
8-10; and Sylvia Walsh, Liz,i11g Poetically: Kierkeganrd's Exisle11tinl Aesthetics
(Unjvcrsity Park: Pern-isylvania State University Press, 1994) 15.
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indirect com1nunication. On his first way of talking about the term, 
"indirect communication" refers roughly to Socrates' midwifery or maieutic method.8 Iinportantly, Kierkegaard does not identify the 
midwifery method with the Socratic elenchus, the specific practice of 
engaging in an adversarial dialogue with someone by asking 
questions about the person's beliefs.9 He identifies it instead with the 
more general pedagogical strategy that the elenchus instantiates. The 
defining feature of this general strategy is that the teacher does not 
explicitly tell the learners the truth but rather helps them discover or 
"give birth" to it for themselves (PF, 10-13). To use Kierkegaard's 
terminology, the midwife helps other people "stand alone" in the 
learning process (JP, 1:650, section 15; cf. WL, 275). In contemporary 
parlance we might say that the midwife promotes active learning or 
discovery learning. 
The difficulty here concerns precisely how to understand the 
process by which the teacher encourages discovery learning. Under 
what conditions does Kierkegaard think it occurs? That is to say, 
under what conditions does he think that the teacher successfully 
engages in indirect communication in this first sense? 
The secondary literature contains a diversity of views on this 
1natter. Far and away the dominant approach is to describe the 
relevant conditions in terms of the degree to which the learner is 
active in the pedagogical process. Among the scholars who adopt 
this approach there are two camps. Members of the first camp say 
that indirect communication occurs whenever the learner is active at all in the pedagogical process.10 The threshold here is obviously quite 
8seeJP1:109;JP1 :653 , section24;JP6:6783; CUP, 1:277; OMWA, 7. For Socrates' 
account of himself as a spiritual midwife, see Plato, Theaetetus 149 a-b, 150 a- d. For 
discussions of the connection between indirect communication and the maieutic 
method, see Daise, Kierkegaard's Socratic Art, 14 -36; Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript," 9 -11 , 102-105; John Lippitt, Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 45-46 , 135 -46; Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet ( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) 
284; and Merold Westphal, Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Con.eluding Unscientif c Postscript (West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, 1996) 60-64. 
9For a discussion of the elenchus, see Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," The Journal of Philosophy 79 /11 (1982): 711-14. 
10George Hale, Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002) 24; Nerina Jansen, "Deception in Service of the Truth: 
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low. After all, even the most passive kind of learning requires some
amount of uptake on the part of the learner. As a consequence, those
who take this approach tend to categorize all or almost all communi­
cation as indirect con1munication. 
Commentators who belong to the second camp of interpretation 
find this consequence unacceptable. They point out that neither 
Kierkegaard nor any of the pseudonyms state that all or almost all 
communication is indirect communication. In fact, Johannes 
Climacus suggests that direct communication is the norm (CUP, 1:74). Men1bers of the second camp conclude that there 1nust be 
restrictions on the kind of activity on the part of the learner that 
counts. In particular, they maintain that indirect communication 
occurs only if the learner actively reflects on the in1 plications and 
ramifications for his or her own life of the knowledge he or she 
acquires. In other words, it occurs only if the teacher prompts the 
learner to engage in what Climacus calls subjective trunking or 
subjective reflection (see CUP, 1:73-76, 192-203).11
This restriction, however, strikes 1ne as somewhat ad-hoc. I see 
no obvious reason why this particular kind of activity matters while 
other kinds do not.12 I grant that Kierkegaard ahnost always talks 
Magister Kierkegaard and the Problem of Communication" in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary: Con.eluding Unscientific Postscript to "Philosophical 
Fragments," ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1997) 125; 
Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 294; Edward F. Mooney, "Kierkegaard, 
Inwardness, and Belief: Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication" in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to "Philosophical 
Fragments," ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1997) 134; 
George Pattison, "'Who' Is the Discourse? A Study in Kierkegaard's Religious 
Literature,'' Kierkegaardiana 16 (1993): 43; and Michael Strawser, Both/And: Reading 
Kierkegaard from Irony to Edification (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997) 181-
83. 
11Broudy, "Kierkegaard on Indirect Conununication," 227; Evans, Kierkegaard's 
"Fragments" and "Postscript,'' 7, 97; David Lochhead, "Comment to H. A. Nielsen's 
'Two Levels of Indirect Communication: Language and "Legend" in Mark 6,' " in 
Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, ed. Alastair McKim1on (Monh·eal: Laurier 
University Press, 1982) 102; Walsh, Living Poetically, 10-11; and Westphal, Becoming 
a Self, 64. 
12Notice also that if Kierkegaard stipulates that indirect commw1.ication occurs 
whenever the learner engages in subjective reflection, then the case for the 
indispensability thesis is easily made. Perhaps too easily for our satisfaction. Jt 
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about indirect communication in situations where the learner must 
appropriate the content of the communication into how he or she 
lives his or her life. However, I believe this fact says more about 
Kierkegaard's specific pedagogical goals than it does about the 
nature of indirect communication. Such appropriation is what Kierkegaard wants to bring about in his readers by way of his use of 
indirect communication. But it is not therefore the only thing 
someone can bring about by way of indirect communication. Indeed, 
we can find passages in Kierkegaard's corpus describing cases where 
indirect communication does not serve this end at all (see, e.g., CUP 1:277-78). 
I find it more helpful and more exegetically accurate to describe 
the conditions under which something counts as indirect communi­
cation (in the first sense) in terms of the degree to which the learner 
depends on the teacher. I submit the following definition. Indirect 
communication (in this first sense) occurs if and only if 
(1) the teacher provides some relevant form of guidance to the
learner; but
(2) the learner does not depend on the teacher's authority for thejustification of the knowledge acquired or the decision 1nade as
a result of the learning process; and
(3) the learner does not depend on the teacher for the content of the
knowledge acquired or the decision made as a result of the
learning process (i.e., the teacher does not explicitly or implicitly
tell the learner what he or she is supposed to learn or decide).13
Some comments about these conditions are in order. The first
condition is included in order to rule out the possibility that some­
one could engage in indirect communication without saying 
anything or even doing anything remotely communicative.14 Not 
follows simply by d,efinition that indirect co1mnunication is indispensable for the 
task of getting the learner to engage in subjective reflection. 
13This account bears some rough similarities to the one developed by Poul 
Ltibcke. See "Kierkegaard and Indirect Coirununication," 31-40. Ltibcke, however, 
focuses on the task of helping the learner make a decision and not that of helping 
the learner acquire knowledge. ] wish to cast a wider net. 
14Note that this does not necessarily rule out silence insofar as being silent in 
a given situation can imply certain things and thus provide the learner with some 
guidance. 
302 International Kierkegaard Commentary 
only would this be an intuitively strange result, it is one that 
Climacus seems to reject in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (CuP, 1:65-66). The second condition is drawn fr01n the early pages of Philosophical Fragnients. There Cli1nacus praises Socratic 1nidwives precisely because they do not serve as authority figures for other 
human beings (PF, 10-12). This strongly suggests that not serving as 
an authority figure is an important part of being a midwife. The 
third condition comes from Practice in Christianity. Here Anti­
Climacus states that the indirect communicator does not tell the 
learner exactly what the outcome of the learning process is supposed 
to be. Instead, the indirect com1nunicator provides the learner with 
a puzzle or problem that the learner must figure out for himself or 
herself (PC, 133; cf. CUP, 1:242). 
We can sharpen our understanding of this kind of indirect 
co1nmunication by looking at a paradig1natic instance of it: Eithe1/0r. 
This book contains what amounts to a debate between two fictional 
characters, A and Judge William, over the merits of their respective 
lifeviews. An important feature of the book is that it does not contain 
a conclusion to the debate (see CUP, 1:252-54). It does not end with 
one character acknowledging the superiority of the other's lifeview. 
Nor does the fictional editor, Victor Ere1nita, step in to render an 
impartial judgment. In addition, lest readers try to learn who is 
supposed to win by looking to the lifeview of the actual author, 
Kierkegaard publishes the book under a pseudony1n. He even goes 
so far as to deceive the citizens of Copenhagen into thinking that he 
is a loafer or idler who lacks the motivation and drive necessary for 
writing such a book (PV, 58-63). The purpose of these tactics is to 
force readers to figure out for themselves which lifeview wins and 
why.15 In this way, conditions (2) and (3) above obtain. Nevertheless, 
readers are not left entirely without guidance. Either/Or offers a rich 
account of the two con1peting lifeviews, one that lays bare their 
various drawbacks and advantages. This account enables readers to 
make an infonned but still nonetheless independent judgrn.ent about 
which lifeview is superior. Thus, condition (1) obtains as well. 
So much for Kierkegaard's first way of talking about indirect 
15See CUP, 1:296-97; PC, 133; Liibcke, "Kierkegaard and Indirect 
Communication," 36. 
The Point ef 1/iew 303 communication. On his second way of talking about the term, "in­direct communication'1 refers not to a general pedagogical strategy but rather to the use of specific artful literary devices. Chief among the relevant devices is pseudonymity. However, it is not the only de­vice on the list. Kierkegaard also includes deception, humor, irony, ambiguity, fictional narratives, and "imaginative constructions. 1116 It is worth noting at this point that the distinction between this second way of talking about indirect communication and the first way often gets obscured in Kierkegaard's writings. The reason is that Kierkegaard often uses artful literary devices when engaging in the nudwifery nlethod, as seen in the case of Either/Or. Nevertheless it is important to respect the difference between the two ways of talking about indirect communication. There are at least two reasons why. First, Kierkegaard sometimes categorizes the use of artful literary devices as indirect communication without regard for whether this use occurs in the service of the midwifery method. In other words, he sometimes applies the label in question to the use of artful literary devices in contexts where the midwifery method is simply not under discussion.17 Second, Kierkegaard explicitly states that his up building discourses do not count as indirect communica­tion even though they are n1aieutic in nature. He justifies this state­ment by pointing out that the discourses do not exhibit the use of certain artful literary devices, in particular pseudonymity (JP, 1:656; 
16See Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript," 105-107; Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 255-96; Jamie Turnbull, "Kierkegaard, Indirect 
Communication, and Ambiguity," TheHeythrop Joumal50/l (2009): 13-22. Someone 
may object that Kierkegaard's decision to use the label "indirect communication" 
in this context is a bit strange. It certainly does not track our pretheoretical 
understanding of how to use the label. For example, I am not pretheoretically 
inclined to call Hamlet indirect communication simply because it contains irony, 
ambiguity, fictional narratives, etc. This objection, however, is beside the point. The 
practice of using such artful literary devices is a recognizable and wide-spread one. 
In addition, as we will see, Kierkegaard claims that this practice is indispensable for 
his purposes. That is the claim I wish to investigate. What exactly Kierkegaard 
decides to call the practice of using artful literaJy devices - be it "indirect 
communication" or something else- is irrelevant as far as my project is concerned. 
17For a discussion of passages in Kierkegaard's writings where this occurs, see
Aumam1, "Kierkegaard on the Need for Indirect Communication," 30-57. 
304 International Kierkegaard Commentar�' 6:6701).18 The implication is that, at least here, he is reserving the title 
of "indirect communication" for writings that do exhibit the use of 
such devices. Fron1 these two pieces of evidence, I draw the conclu­
sion that the second way of talking about indirect communication 
picks out a distinct way in which Kierkegaard employs the term .. 
Hence, it requires independent treatinent. 
The main problem with the second way of talking is that it is 
difficult to develop a helpful definition of" artful literary devices." 
An intensional definition is a nonstarter. Kierkegaard does not tell 
us what essential feature all and only artful literary devices share 
such that using them counts as indirect co1nmunication. Nor does it 
seem feasible for us to come up with a list of features on our own by 
abstracting away what all of the relevant devices have in com1non. 
Another option is an extensional definition. We can say that the 
expression "artful literary devices" refers to those devices the use of 
which Kierkegaard explicitly calls indirect com1nunication. This defi­
nition has obvious drawbacks. It does not tell us what to say about 
devices Kierkegaard does not discuss. Nor does it satisfy our curi­
osity as to why he picks out all and only the devices that he does. 
Nevertheless, an extensional definition does provide enough in.for­
mation to determine the meaning of the indispensability thesis. To 
wit, indirect communication (in the second sense) is indispensable 
if and only if there are some projects we can accomplish only by way 
of one of the literary devices the use of which Kierkegaard desig­
nates as indirect communication. Since analyzing the indis­
pensability thesis is the main goal of this paper, the extensional 
definition provides us with what we need. 
In the end, Kierkegaard says exciting and provocative things 
about both kinds of indirect communication. He ultin1ately main­
tains that both are indispensable for his purposes. Nevertheless, the 
use of pseudonyms, humor, deception, fiction, etc. is s01newhat 
1nore conspicuous in his writings than the use of the midwifery 
- - ------
18George Pattison argues that Kierkegaard should not classify the upbuilding 
discourses in the way that he does in these passages. Even according to what I call 
the second way of talking about indirect communication, the up building discourses 
fit the bill. Although they are not published under pseudonyms, they do contajn 
other artful literary devices. See Pattison, "The Theory and Practice of Language 
and Conununication," 85-87; Kierkegnnrd's Upbuildi11g Discourses, 12-34. 
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method. In addition, he provides a more explicit defense of the indis­
pensability of this kind of indirect communication. Therefore, this is 
where I will focus my attention in the rest of the paper. Indirect Con11nunication and the Crowd 
One argument that Kierkegaard sets forth regarding the need for 
indirect communication and that has received some mention in the 
secondary literature concerns a criticism Kierkegaard levels against 
modern society.19 The criticism is that people lose themselves in the 
"crowd" instead of becoming" single individuals." What this means 
is that they frivolously and thoughtlessly accept the judgments of 
others instead of carefully coming to conclusions by and for then1-
selves (UDVS, 127-37; TA, 90-94). They lack the courage to make a 
decision- especially one having to do with ethics and religion -
without simply deferring to public opinion on the matter.20
People fear making decisions for themselves because it opens up 
certain undesirable possibilities. That is to say, it brings into play 
certain unpleasant situations that would otherwise not be in play. 
Two in particular are worthy of note. First, if you make a decision for 
yourself, you might not end up making the same decision as other 
people. You therefore might not enjoy the natural comfort that comes 
with human solidarity (JP, 4:4885). Moreover, you might experience 
the discomfort of persecution or peer pressure (TSI, 120; UDVS, 136). 
After all, other people also want to enjoy the comfort of solidarity. 
If you do not share their opinion, you inhibit them from enjoying 
this comfort fully. Thus, they will be well-motivated to pressure you 
19See Emmanuel, "Reading Kierkegaard," 252; Evans, Kierkegaard's" Fragments" and "Postscript," 106; John Lippitt, Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought, 25-26, 136; Mooney, "Kierkegaard, Inwardness, and Belief," 135-37; and George Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 2nd ed. (London: SCM-Canterbury Press, 1999) 69-73. 2°TSI, 108; JP, 3:2964; JP, 3:3229; and JP, 4:4941. For discussjons of the problem of "the public," see Pat Cutting, "The Levels of Interpersonal Relationships in Kierkegaard's Two Ages" in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1984) 78, 82; NerinaJansen, "The Individual versus the Public: A Key to Kierkegaard's Views of the Daily Press" in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Corsair Affair, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1990) 1-21. 
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into conforn1ing to their views. Second, if you make decisions for 
yourself, you bear the responsibility for those decisions (UDVS, 132-
33). Thus if you happen to decide wrongly, you will be subject to 
blame. The blame might come from other people. But, even more 
frightfully, it might come from God or from yourself in the form of 
the voice of conscience (UDVS, 128-29). The 1nere threat of such 
possibilities brings with it the uneasiness of anxiety. 
Kierkegaard claims that people think they can avoid these 
undesirable possibilities by following the crowd (UDVS, 128; JP, 3:2968). They believe that if they follow the crowd, they will not have 
to worry a bout missing out on the comfort of solidarity. Nor will 
they have to worry about suffering the discomfort of persecution 
and peer pressure. Finally, they will not have to worry about the 
possibility of becoming blameworthy or the accompanying feeling 
of anxiety (UDVS, 128-29). For they believe they will be able to 
deflect responsibility for their decisions onto the crowd, as ·we see 
paradign1atically in the case of the person who appeals to the fact 
that" everyone does it" as an excuse (TSI, 107). 
Kierkegaard grants that following the crowd provides a number 
of psychological comforts. But he denies that it enables people to 
avoid responsibility for their actions and beliefs. He offers two 
reasons for this denial. First, the crowd does not exist in and of itself. 
It is an abstract object like a class or a set. As such, it is identical with 
the individuals that comprise it. It is not some thing over and above 
them (TSI, 108; TA, 90-93). Because the crowd is not a distinct 
ontological entity, it cannot be responsible without the people who 
comprise it being responsible. Those who think they can avoid 
responsibility by passing the buck to the crowd overlook this point. 
They implicitly attribute a greater ontological status to the crowd 
than it actually has. They blame some thing that is not really there 
(TSI, 108; TA, 91). 
Second, even if the crowd were a distinct ontological entity, the 
people who followed the crowd would not avoid responsibility 
entirely. Such people would still be responsible for their decision to 
go along with the crowd in the first place. For Kierkegaard 1naintains 
(perhaps too optimistically) that the pressure to follow the crowd is 
never entirely coercive. We are always free to go it alone. Since we 
can break with the crowd, we are responsible for our decision not to 
do so. This is in part what Kierkegaard means when he says, "How 
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you act and the responsibility for it is finally wholly and solely yours 
as an individual."21 
Nevertheless, following the crowd might still allow people to ignore the fact that they are responsible. In other words, even though 
following the crowd does not actually allovv people to avoid 
responsibility, they might wrongly believe that it does. And if they 
hold such a belief, they will not see themselves as responsible when 
they follow the crowd. 
This is a serious problem in Kierkegaard's eyes. He views 
owning up to one's responsibility for how one acts and what one 
believes as an essential part of ideal human existence. Indeed, to 
become "the single individual," which he so often praises as the 
highest goal in life, involves inter alia beillg clearly and continually 
conscious of one's responsibility as a moral and religious agent 
(UDVS, 127; TSI, 117; OMWA, 10). Accordingly, Kierkegaard wants 
to get people to see that following the crowd does not allow them to 
avoid personal responsibility. Short of that, he wants to discourage 
people from actually following the crowd so that they cannot use 
this as an evasion tactic in order to avoid acknowledging personal 
responsibility for their lives. Finally, as a first step ill this whole 
process, he wants to thwart people from following him ill particular. 
After all, following him would just be another token of the same 
problematic type as following the crowd. This final point brings us 
to one main purpose of Kierkegaard's artful literary devices. They 
push his readers away, encouraging or even forcing them to "stand 
alone" (JP, 1:653, sections 23-24; SLW, 344-45). 
Textual support abounds for the idea that indirect 
communication serves to create distance between author and reader. 
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript to "Philosophical Fragments," 
Johannes Climacus suggests that the indirect communicator does not 
induce people to go the same way as he or she does, but rather urges 
the1n to go their own way: 
Indirect communication makes communicating an art in a sense different 
21S0ren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing: Spiritual Preparation for the Office of Confession, trans. Douglas V. Steere (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1956) 189. I depart from the Hong and Hong translation here for the sake of 
emphasis. 
308 International J(ierkegaard Commentary from what one ordinarily assumes it to be .... To stop a man on the street and to stand still in-order to speak with him is not as difficult as having to say something to a passerby in passing, without standing still oneself or delaying the other, without wanting to induce him to go the same way, but just urging him to go his own way. (CUP, 1:277) 
Elsewhere Clin1acus asserts that the aim of indirect co1nmunica-
tion is to set readers free (CUP, 1:74). He also says that such commu­
nication" establishes a chas1nic gap between reader and author and 
fixes the separation of inwardness between them" (CUP, 1:263). For 
still further support, we can look at how Kierkegaard actually em­
ploys his artful literary devices. His use of pseudonyn1s, for example, 
inhibits readers from learning whether he himself endorses the 
views contained in his books. And his use of "i1naginative construc­
tions" - the thought experi1nents he develops in a hypothetical or 
subjunctive mood - achieves the same end by making it unclear 
whether he actually stands behind what he says. 
Let us grant, then, that Kierkegaard uses indirect communication 
to push people away and discourage them from depending on him. 
The question re1nains: does he need artful literary devices for this 
purpose? Are such devices indispensable £or this purpose? I doubt it. 
As Vanessa Rumble points out, Kierkegaard could push readers 
away with a straightforward or direct communication.22 He could, 
for example, silnply tell them not to depend on him. In fact, Kierke­
gaard follows this procedure in his signed writings. We read in the 
preface to each set of Upbuilding Discourses: "[This little book] is 
called 'discourses,' not sermons, because its author does not have 
authority to preach, 'upbuilding discourses,' not discourses for 
up building, because the speaker by no 1neans claims to be a teacher" 
(EUD, 5).23 And, in the preface to For Self-Examination, we read: "My 
dear reader, read aloud, if possible .... By reading aloud you will 
gain the strongest i1npression that you have only yourself to con­
sider, not 111e, who, after alt ain 'without authority,' nor others, 
which would be a distraction" (FSE, 3; cf. JFY, 91-92). It see1ns likely 
that these straightforward requests will discourage at least some 
people fron1 depending i1nproperly on Kierkegaard. If so, indirect 
22Rumble, "To Be as No-One," 311, 313-14. 
2'See also EUD, 53, 107, 179, 231, 295. 
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ommunication is not the only way to accomplish this end. 
There are two ways someone might try to rescue the idea that 
rtful literary devices are indispensable for heading off improper 
.ependence. First, someone might say that we have underestimated 
�e depth of the problem. Kierkegaard worries about people who 
rill depend on him even though he does not want them to do so.24 
imply telling such people that he does not want them to depend on 
.im will not make a difference (and, presumably, neither will 
xplaining to them why they should not do so). Kierkegaard must 
tse more drastic measures. He 1nust actually prevent these people 
rom figuring out what position he endorses in the first place. 
This is an important point. But it does not rescue the idea in 
:uestion. Even if we grant that Kierkegaard 1nust hide his own 
,osition from his readers, it is unclear why doing so requires the use 
,£ special literary or rhetorical devices. For instance, he could say in 
,erfectly plain language, "I do not necessarily advocate the lifestyles 
describe." 
Second, someone 1night try to rescue the idea that artful literary 
levices are needed to head off improper dependence by raising the 
allowing objection. A straightforward attempt to push people 
way- e.g. simply telling people not to depend on you -seems to in­
'Olve a performative contradiction. When you straightforwardly 
ncourage someone to stand alone, you actually discourage that 
>erson from standing alone with respect to one particular decision,
1iz. the higher-order decision about whether or not to stand alone. 
\Tith respect to this higher-order decision, you actually give the per­
on a rhetorical push toward one option-which is the exact 
ipposite of letting the person stand alone. Therefore, if you want the 
>erson to stand alone with respect to everything, including the higher­
>rder decision about whether or not to stand alone, you contradict
1ourself by straightforwardly encouraging him or her to stand alone.
\nd perhaps that is why someone who wants to encourage people
o stand alone 1nust turn to indirect communication (cf. CUP, 1:75).
24Ideally, people will not even desire to become Kierkegaard's followers and 
bus revealing his views will not matter. However, Kierkegaard does not write for 
in ideal audience. He writes for those who actually are inclined to depend on him 
nan inappropriate m.anner. The suggestion here is that accommodating the flaws 
>f his readers requires the use of a special strategy.
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V\Te can sharpen this objection by putting it in slightly different terms. Kierkegaard wants to leave it up to his readers to decide forthemselves how to live their lives. However, some of his readersmight decide that they want to live their lives as Kierkegaard' 8followers. Their thoughtful and honest decision might be to become Kierkegaardians and do whatever he does. By straightforwardly pushing these people away, Kierkegaard discourages the1n from choosing this option. But that means he has not left it entirely up to thein to decide how to live their lives. And thus he has not done what he wants to do. We can deal with this objection as follows. First, it is not clear that the objection actually applies to Kierkegaard. He does not 1naintain that the learner should stand alone unconditionally or with respect to everything. He only maintains that the learner should stand alone with respect to ethical and religious decisions. This qualification opens up roo1n for giving straightforward rhetorical pushes elsewhere and, in particular, with respect to the higher-order decision about whether or not to stand alone when n1aking ethical or religious decisions. Once such room exists, the aforementioned contradiction goes away. Someone n1ight counter that the higher-order decision in ques­tion is itself an ethical or religious decision. Thus the above-men­tioned qualification does not help and the objection against using direct com1nunication returns. Under this interpretation, however, turning to indirect conm1unication does nothing to improve matters. Hiding behind a pseudonym or writing in a subjunctive mood also encourages readers to make decisions for then1selves. For it prevents them from knowing what the author believes and thus prevents them from becoming his or her followers. In this way it too favors one of the options facing the person 1naking a higher-order decision about whether or not to stand alone. This, of course, is the same con­sideration that led to a perforn1ative contradiction above in the case of direct cominunication. Therefore, by the saine reasoning, it will lead to one here in the case of indirect com1nunication. In su1runary, we have identified one purpose for which Kierke­gaard uses indirect con1munication: encouraging people to 1nake ethical and religious decisions for themselves. However, we have not established that indirect com1nunication is the only way to accon1-plish this purpose. In fact, on one interpretation, it runs aground on 
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the same problem as direct communication. Thus, we have not 
proven the indispensability thesis here. A Monstrous Illusion 
I suggested in the introduction that Kierkegaard offers us a 
second reason for turning to indirect communication (understood as 
the use of artful literary devices). To get at this reason, we will have 
to look closely at one faction of his target audience. Our inspection 
wilJ reveal that this faction suffers from a very peculiar problem (in 
addition to that of wanting to follow the crowd). Thinking about the 
nature 0£ this problem will shed light on why Kierkegaard trunks he 
must use indirect communication to address his audience.25
The standard way to describe the problem plaguing Kierke­
gaard's target audience is to refer to his assertion that it suffers from 
"a monstrous illusion [ uhyre Sandsebedrag ]" (PV, 41). 26 The ill us ion is 
that Denmark is a Christian nation, a country in which "all are 
Christians." To say that the members of the audience suffer fron1 the 
illusion is to say that they buy into this falsehood. They consider 
themselves and each other Christians when in fact they are not. Kier­
kegaard calls this unfortunate state-of-affairs "Christendom" (PV, 41-44).
It is tempting to think that the problem here is one of ordinary
25In this section, I explain why Kierkegaard thinks his audience suffers from 
self-deception. In the following section, I explain why he thinks addressing self­
deception requires the use of indirect communication. The details in each case have 
to do with Christianity. However, nothing hangs on these details. Kierkegaard's 
argument as to why addressing self-deception requires the use of indirect 
communication would apply to any case of self-deception. Those not interested in 
Christianity can substitute a case that suits their purposes. 26see also PV, 23, 48, 88; OMW A, 8n**. For other discussions of the illusion 
plaguing Kierkegaard's audience, see 0. K. Bouwsrna, "Notes on Kierkegaard's' the 
Monstrous Illusion'," in Without Proof or Evidence, ed. J. L. Craft and Ronald E. 
Huswit (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984) 73-86; James Conant, "Putting 
Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point of View for Their 
Works as Authors" in Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, ed. Timothy 
Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 272-81; 
Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 70-71; and D. Z. Phillips, 
"Authorship and Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein" in Wittgenstein n11d Religion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 210-12. 
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ignorance. The relevant story might run as follows. Kierkegaard's
audience never learned and thus does not know what it really takes
to be a Christian. It operates under son1-e well-meaning but ulti­
mately erroneous standard. According to this erroneous standard, 
everyone does qualify as a Christian; the appearance that all are 
Christians is not misleading but an accurate reflection of the truth. 
Thus the members of Kierkegaard's audience fall prey to the illusion 
si1nply because they do not know any better. 
Kierkegaard does not accept this story. He does not believe that 
his audience suffers from ordinary ignorance. As he sees it, the facts 
of the matter are clear and no honest person could entertain the idea 
that all are Christians. He says: 
Everyone who in earnest and also with some clarity of vision considers 
what is called Christendom, or the condition in a so-called Christian 
country, must without any doubt immediately have serious misgivings. 
What does it mean, after all, that these thousands and thousands as a 
matter of course call themselves Christians! These many, many people, of 
whom by far the great majority, according to everything that can be 
discerned, have their lives in entirely different categories, something one 
can ascertain by the simplest observation! People who perhaps never once 
go to church, never think about God, never name his name except when 
they curse! People to whom it has never occurred that their lives should 
have some duty to God .... 
That there must be an enormous underlying confusion here, a 
dreadful illusion ffrygteligt Sandsebedrag], of that there can surely be no 
doubt. (PV, 41) 
Thus Kierkegaard thinks that the members of his audience know better than to do what they are doing. They know they should not 
call their way of living "Christianity," but they do so anyway. 
We can elaborate on what it means to say Kierkegaard's audi­
ence "knows better" by picking up on a distinction Climacus draws 
in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The distinction concerns the dif­
ference between" abstract Sunday-understanding" and the concrete 
understanding of the rest of the week (CUP, 1:469). On Sundays, 
when they listen to the pastor preach, the Danish citizens grasp the 
concept of Christianity accurately. They realize that it picks out a set 
of strenuous behaviors. In particular, they understand that living a 
Christian life involves denying oneself, loving one's neighbor, 
following the paradign1 of Christ, etc. On the other six days of the 
week, however, they fail to engage in these behaviors. They do not 
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practice self-denial; they do not love their neighbors; and they do not 
follow the paradigm of Christ. Yet they still call themselves Christians. 
They thereby betray that they understand the concept of Christianity 
differently during the week than they did on Sunday. It no longer 
picks out a set of strenuous behaviors. It picks out something more 
trivial- like being a citizen of Denmark or having a baptismal 
certificate at home in a drawer (CUP, 1:367). In sum, when Kier­
kegaard's fellow Danes use the concept of Christianity during the 
week, they water down its meaning. However, given their 
acquaintance with the proper meaning of the concept, this use or 
rather misuse of the concept cannot qualify as an honest 1nistake. It 
cannot be the result of simple ignorance. They know better than to 
talk this way.27
Examples of this phenomenon abound in Kierkegaard's writings. 
A particularly illuminating one arises in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Here Climacus describes a Sunday sermon on the 
Christian principle that" a man is capable of nothing" (CUP, 1:467). 
27 A tangential question arises here concerning what really makes Climacus 
upset. On the one hand, it might be that Climacus objects to what he sees as the 
improper use of Christian language during the week. He might believe there is some 
objectively correct way to use Christian language that people learn about on 
Sundays yet fail to employ during the week. On the other hand, it might be that 
Climacus simply dislikes the inconsistency between the Sunday understanding of 
Christianity and the weekday understanding. On this reading, Climacus would be 
perfectly happy if people embraced tl1e weekday understanding- if only they 
would openly reject the Sunday understanding. James Conant embraces the latter 
option. He claims that "Kierkegaard would have no dispute at all with someone who 
actually thinks one can be a Christian simply by being a citizen" ("Putting Two and 
Two Together," 274). Admittedly, Climacus sometimes talks this way: "But one of 
the two must be a jest: either what the pastor says is a jest, a kind of parlor game one 
plays at times and bears in mind that a human being is capable of nothing, or the 
pastor must indeed be right when he says that a person must always bear this in 
mind- and the rest of us, the pastor, and I, too, are wrong in that we exegete the 
word 'always' so poorly" (CUP, 1:470-71). However, I think the former option 
outlined above is the better one. I think Climacus believes there is an objectively 
correct way to use Christian language. Evidence for this position comes from the 
passages where he accuses people of turning Christianity into something it is not 
(CUP, 1:369-81). It would be impossible to tum Christianity into something it was 
not if there were no objective truth regarding what Christianity is. Thus, passages 
such as the one just quoted should not be read straightforwardly but rather as a 
kind of rhetorical posturing. 
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The idea here is not that the powers and abilities hu1nan beings
appear to have are illusory. It is rather that such things are not of
their own making. Whatever powers and abilities they possess come 
from God. (We can think of this as an instance of the general 
principle set forth in the Epistle of James: "every good gift and every 
perfect gift is fro1n above."28) The existential upshot of this idea is
that people ought not to think highly of themselves or to become 
self-important because they have certain abilities. They should 
hu1nbly acknowledge that in and of themselves they can do nothing; 
they need God's help to do even the least thing. In this respect, they 
are no better than anyone else (CUP, 1:467).29
Climacus says that the sermon was easy to understand and that 
everyone grasped exactly what the pastor meant (CUP, 1:467). Still, 
he decides to send a spy out among the people to discover how they 
interpret the message during the rest of the week. After numerous 
run-ins, the spy reports his findings: 
And so it goes, for six days of the week we are all capable of something. 
The king is capable of more than the prime minister. The witty journalist 
says: I will show so-and-so what I am capable of doing-namely, make 
him look ridiculous. The policeman says to the man dressed in a jacket: 
You very likely do not know what I am capable of doing-namely arrest 
him. The cook says to the poor woman who comes on Saturdays: You 
apparently have forgotten what I am capable of doing-namely, of 
prevailing upon the master and mistress so that the poor woman no longer 
receives the leftovers of the week. We are all capable of something, and the 
king smiles at the prime minister's capability, and the prime minister 
laughs at the journalist's, and the journalist at the policeman's, and the 
policeman at the blue collar worker's, and the blue collar worker at the 
Saturday-woman's-and on Sunday we all go to church ( except the cook, 
who never has time, because on Sunday there is always a dinner party at 
the councilor's house) and hear the pastor declare that a human being is 
capable of nothing at all- that is, if by good fortune, we have not gone to 
a speculative pastor's church. 
But wait a minute. We have entered the church; with the help of a 
very capable sexton (for the sexton is especially capable on Sundays and 
with a silent glance indicates to so-and-so what he is capable of doing), 
each of us takes a place in relation to one's specific capability in society. 
28James 1:17 (King James Version). 
2QK.ierkegaard discusses this principle at some length in his signed discourses. 
See EUD, 321-26; CD, 298-300. 
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Then the pastor enters the pulpit-but at the last moment there is a very 
capable man who has come late, and the sexton must demonstrate his cap­
ability. Then the pastor begins, and now all of us, from our respective dif­
ferent seats and points of view, understand what the pastor is saying from 
his elevated standpoint: that a human being is capable of nothing at all. (CUP, 1:470) 315 
Here we have an example of what it means to say that the mem­
bers of Kierkegaard's audience "know better." On the one hand, they do understand Christianity. For on Sunday they hear, understand, 
and acknowledge the truth that they cannot do anything without 
God's help. On the other hand, they act as if they do not understand 
Christianity. For during the rest of the week they take every 
opportunity to ascribe power first and foremost to themselves and 
to become self-important-yet still call themselves Christians. 
At this point, an interesting set of questions arises. Why does this 
inconsistency persist? Why do people continue to misuse Christian 
language if they know better? Why do people continue to claim" all 
are Christians" if they can" ascertain by the si1nplest observation" 
that no one lives Christianly? 
The striking answer is that people want to misuse language in 
this way; they want the illusion to remain in place. Thus Kierkegaard 
says the delusion [Indbildning] exists because the people are deluding 
themselves [indbilder sig] (OMW A, 8n**). In other words, the illusion [Sandsebedrag] is actually a case of self-deception [Selvbedrag].30
Admittedly, Kierkegaard often accuses the pastors of encourag­
ing the illusion (JP, 3:3620; TM, 136). But the people are not any less 
blameworthy as a result. For the pastors are simply giving them 
what they want (CUP, 1:478). And, as Kierkegaard starkly puts it in Judge for Yourself!, the people want to be deceived: 
Yes, it is true that people will very readily blame the proclaimers of 
Christianity and seek the fault in them (and this may well be the way to 30 Although there is a slight difference in meaning, Kierkegaard tends to use the 
words "illusion [Sandsebedrag]" and "delusion [In.dbildn.in.g]" interchangeably. 
Evidence for this claim comes from the following passage in The Paint of View for MyWork as an Author: "On the assumption that Clu-istendorn is an enormous illusion [Sandsebedrag], that it is a delusion [Indbildnin.g] on the part of the multitude who call 
themselves Christians, in all probability the illusion [ Sandsebedrag] we are discussing 
here is very common" (PV, 48). 
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become the Christian public's favorite); but it is perhaps rather the 
Christian public, which because of the fear of men (to which the 
proclaimers certainly should not yield) forces the proclaimers to deceive 
this Christian public .... The world wants to be deceived; not only is it 
deceived - ah, then the matter would not be so dangerous! - but it wants
to be deceived. lntensely, more intensely, more passionately perhaps lhan 
any witness to the truth has fought for the truth, the world fights to be 
deceived; it most gratefully rewards with applause, money, and prestige 
anyone who complies with its wish to be deceived. 
(JFY, 139-40; see also TM, 45; CD, 170-71) 
Here we can see the truth of our initial suggestion that the 
problen1 is not one of ordinary ignorance. It is rather one of willed 
ignorance. The people do not want to overco1ne their confusion, 
their inconsistency, and their misuse of language. They want to 
maintain a lack of clarity about the1nselves and their lives (CD, 181). 
Of course, this conclusion begs another set of questions: Why do 
the members of Kierkegaard's audience want to misuse language? 
Why do they want the illusion to remain in place? Why do they want 
to be deceived? 
Kierkegaard answers these questions obliquely in part three of Christian Discourses (CD, 163-87). He says that people want to be 
deceived because owning up to the truth would force them to make 
a decision they desperately want to avoid. If they owned up to the 
truth, either they would have to stop calling the1nselves Christians or
they would have to change how they live their lives. But they do not 
want to do either of these two things. On the one hand, they want 
the psychological benefits of calling themselves Christians. They 
want to be able to say of themselves and their loved ones that they 
are doing what, as far as they are concerned in a Christian nation 
and a Christian era, is the highest thing a human being can do. On 
the other hand, they want to enjoy comfortable, easygoing, cozy, 
aesthetic lives (cf. CUP, 1:85). They do not want to engage in the 
constant struggle and strain of the Christian life with its demand of 
self-denial and its promise of suffering (CD, 171, 179). Thus, we can 
see how Kierkegaard's audience is well-motivated to cover up the 
distinction between the Christian-religious mode of existence and 
the aesthetic mode of existence-a distinction that, in smne sense, 
they already recognize. 
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Armed with this understanding of the problem plaguing Kierke­
gaard's audience, we can now investigate the claims he makes about 
how to accommodate it. The thrust of these clailns comes out clearly 
in the following passage:" An illusion can never be removed directly, 
and basically only indirectly [kun grundigt indirekte]. If it is an illusion 
that all are Christians, and if something is to be done, it must be 
done indirectly'' (PV, 43). We find a similar message a few lines later: On the assumption, then, that a religious author has from the ground up become aware of this illusion, Christendom, and to the limit of his ability with, note well, the help of God, wants to stamp it out [vil det tillivs ]-what is he to do then? Well, first and foremost, no impatience. If he becomes impatient, then he makes a direct assault and accomplishes­nothing. By a direct attack he only strengthens a person in the illusion and also infuriates him. (PV, 43; cf. PV, 53) 
To summarize these two passages, we can say that Kierkegaard 
believes indirect communication is indispensable for the task of 
removing an illusion.31 That is, he believes only indirect and not 
direct communication can stamp it out. 
To see why Kierkegaard's position might make sense, we need 
to understand what he means by a "direct" approach. Although he 
does not explicitly say so, we are led to believe he means" direct" in 
the sense of blunt talk and straight shooting, i.e. in the sense of 
avoiding deceptive, ironic, and otherwise elusive speech. Thus 
someone who approached the illusion directly would, for example, 
tell the Danish people that (1) there is a distinction between the 
Christian-religious mode of existence and the aesthetic mode of 
existence, (2) they have intentionally confused the two, and (3) they 
lie to themselves when they profess to be Christians.32
31For others who pick up on this claim, see Emmanuel, "Reading Kierkegaard," 242; Jansen, "Deception in Service of the Truth," 120, 124; Lippitt, Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought, 20-21; and Genia Schonbaumsfeld, A Confusion of the Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007) 40-41. 
321 do not pretend that this example captures the only way to engage iI1 direct communication in this context. However, I do maintain that anything that warrants the label "direct communication" here will bear some kind of family resemblance 
318 International K.ierkegaard Commentary 
In an important passage from The Point of Vieiu for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard describes what will happen to someone who 
engages in such a direct communication: 
Every once in a while a religious enthusiast appears. He makes an assault 
on Christendom; he makes a big noise, denounces nearly all as not being 
Christians-and he accomplishes nothing . .  First and foremost, [the 
people] pay no attention to him at all, do not read his book but promptly 
lay it nd ncta [aside]; or if he makes use of the Living Word, they go around 
on another sh·eet and do not listen to him at all. Then by means of a 
definition they smuggle him outside and settle down quite securely in 
their illusion. They make him oul to be a fanatic and his Christianity to be 
an exaggeration-in the end he becomes the only one, or one of the few, 
who is not a Christian in earnest (since exaggeration, after all, is a lack of 
earnestness); the others are all earnest Christians. (PV, 42-43) 
Why does Kierkegaard think things will turn out this way? 
Given what we now know, the answer is not hard to come by. The 
religious enthusiast (the direct comn1unicator) and the target audi­
ence are at cross-purposes. In particular, the audience wants to 
obfuscate or conceal what the direct communicator wants to bring 
to light, viz. the difference between the Christian-religious mode of 
existence (which the audience says it chooses) and the aesthetic 
1node of existence (which it actually chooses). Consequently, if the 
direct communicator comes right out and announces the agenda, the 
audience will work against him or her. It will see the direct con1mu­
nicator coming and arm its defenses appropriately. 
Notice that the opposition between the direct c01nn1unicator and 
the target audience does not result from a factual or theoretical dis­
agreement. In some sense, the audience knows and accepts what the 
direct communicator has to say about the difference between the aes­
thetic and Christian-religious 1nodes of existence. It understands that 
Christianity involves more than being a citizen or having a baptismal 
certificate at home in a drawer. The opposition between the two 
parties arises at the next point, the point of detennining what to do 
about these facts. The direct con11nunicator wanls to bring them to 
light and the audience wants to cover them up. Thus, Kierkegaard 
says that what the 1nembers of his audience really want to avoid is 
a showdown, i.e. a situation in whkh they would have to take the 
to the example I provide. 
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speaker seriously (JP, 1:516). For if they had to take the speaker seri­
ously, they would have to admit to themselves and each other that 
the speaker was right, which is the last thing they want to do. 
Granting that the direct approach faces these obstacles, what is 
the alternative approach that allows us to avoid them? That is to say, 
what does the indirect approach look like? Curiously enough, Kier­
kegaard tells us that the indirect approach to removing an illusion [Indbildning or Sandsebedrag] involves the use of deception [Bedrag]: 
"One can deceive a person out of what is true, and-to recall old 
Socrates-one can deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only 
this way can a deluded person [et Menneske, der er i en Indbildning] 
actually be brought into what is true-by deceiving hirn [at bedrage 
ham]" (PV, 53). The purpose of the deception is to prevent the 
deluded audience from realizing what the communicator has up his 
or her sleeve. The hope is that the communicator will thereby avoid 
setting off the audience's defense mechanisms and hence gain the 
opportunity to make the audience aware of what it does not want to 
be made aware of (PV, 44, 54). 
In order to make sense of what Kierkegaard is saying here, it is 
crucial to recognize that he is only speaking about one small part of 
a larger story. The project of making the audience aware of the truth 
about the aesthetic and religious ways of life is a complex one. It 
requires providing the audience with a new and more accurate 
vision of these alternatives, one more attuned to their subtle and 
often hidden drawbacks and advantages. Among other things this 
will involve helping the audience come to see in a more profound 
way how the aesthetic life suffers from despair and how the 
religious life offers an i1nportant but difficult way out.None of these 
things can be done quickly or easily. However, the first step in the 
process is to capture the audience's attention. It is for this step that 
a deception is necessary. 
Now Kierkegaard recommends that the deception follow what 
we might crudely call a "bait and switch" pattern. The teacher 
should not begin by talking about what he or she ultin1ately wants 
to talk about (PV, 54). As noted, such an approach would repel the 
audience. Instead, the teacher should begin by talking about what 
would interest the audience. The idea here is for the teacher to 
"1nake a big splash" with the members of the audience or to estab­
lish a rapport with them (PV; 44, 54). Then, once the audience's 
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attention has been captured, the teacher is to switch over to what he 
or she ultin1ately wants to talk about. The hope is that the teacher 
will thereby force the audience to see what it does not want to see 
(PV, 44, 54). 
We can fill out our understanding of Kierkegaard's notion of a 
"bait and switch" deception by exploring three concrete exainples. 
Perhaps the most important one comes fron1 Kierkegaard's own 
early (pre-1847) authorship.33 Somewhat controversially,34 Kierke­
gaard asserts that he does not begin his early authorship by talking 
about what he ultimately wants to discuss, nainely the essential 
character of the religious life (PV, 54). He attempts instead to estab­
lish a rapport with people by writing in a way they wiU find interest­
ing (PV, 44). Having thereby gained the attention of his target audi­
ence, he makes the switch. The result is that "the religious is intro­
duced so quickly that that those who, moved by the esthetic, decide 
to follow along are suddenly standing right in the middle of the de­
cisive qualifications of the essentially Christian" (OMWA, 7n*). 
The precise details of how Kierkegaard carries out the bait-and­
switch deception in his early authorship are unclear. One hypothesis 
is that Either/Or is the bait. The switch to the religious then occurs in 
the Two Upbuilding Discourses, which are published three months 
later. Support for this theory comes from an anecdote in TI1e Point of View for My Work as an Author. The anecdote concerns an acquain­
tance who, presun1ably after reading Either/Or, came to believe that 
Kierkegaard was witty and clever. Hoping for n1ore of the same, the 
acquaintance bought the Two Up building Discourses. However, he en­
countered something quite unexpected: the religious (PV, 36; cf. 
OMWA,9). 
33See Jansen, "Deception in Service of the Truth," 121-22, 125. 
34Many commentators have objected that the account Kierkegaard provides inThe Point of View for My Work as an Author and On My 1Nork as an Author is an exercise in revisionist history. See, e.g., Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard, The Myths, and Their Origins, trans. George C. Schoolfield (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1980) 1-31; Joakim Garff, "The Eyes of Argus: The Point of View and Points of View with Respect to Kierkegaard's' Activity as an Author,'" Kierkegnnrdinna 15 (1991): 29-54. However, even if Kierkegaard's account is outright fiction, the story he tellsstill serves as an example of how he understands indirect communication.Therefore, for our purposes, the worries about historical accuracy ru·e irrelevant.
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The problem with this first hypothesis is that it presun1-es people 
saw through the pseudonymity of Either/Or. It presumes they recog­
nized Kierkegaard was responsible for this book. Yet such 
recognition is precisely what Kierkegaard worked so very hard to 
prevent (see, e.g., PV, 60-62). We thus get the strange picture that he 
needed readers to think he wrote Either/Or in order to carry out the 
deception but tried to thwart them from doing so.35 
In order to avoid this absurdity, I favor a different hypothesis. 
The bait and switch takes place entirely within Either/Or. Kierke­
gaard lures people in with the first volume and, in particular, with 
the spectacular "Seducer's Diary." He then makes the switch to the 
religious in the "Ultimatum" at the end of the second volume, which 
speaks about the "uplifting" idea that "in relation to God we are 
always in the wrong" (EO, 2:339).36
A second example of the kind of bait-and-switch deception 
under discussion occurs in Philosophical Fragments (CUP, 1:274n*).37
Here Cli1nacus tries to attract the attention of the Danish Hegelians 
by pretending to engage in a bit of speculative philosophy. His rumi­
nations focus on the learner's paradox found in the Meno. He first 
exa1nines the solution to the paradox provided by the Socratic theory 
of recollection. He then imagines an alternative solution that "goes 
further" than the Socratic position - something the Hegelians were 
wont to do (PF, 20, 24). Quite stunningly, the new hypothesis turns 
out to look just like orthodox Christianity - so much so that he even 
imagines someone accusing him of plagiarism (PF, 35). Thus what 
started out as a bit of novel theorizing ends up as one more reading 
of "the old familiar text handed down from the fathers" (CUP, 
35Thanks to Paul Vincent Spade for drawing this problem to my attention. 
36See Robert L. Perkins, "Either/Or/Or: Giving the Parson His Due" in International Kierkegaard Comm.entary: Eitlm/Or, Part II ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon 
GA: Mercer University Press, 1995) 207-31; and David R. Law, "The Place, Role, and 
Function of the 'Ultimatum' of Eithe1/0r, Part Two, in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous 
Authorship" in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or, Part II ed. Robert L. 
Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1995) 233-57. 
37See Lippitt, Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought, 21-22; Paul Muench, 
"The Socratic Method of Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Johannes Climacus: Indirect 
Communication and the Art of 'Taking Away' " in Soren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. Poul Houe and Gordon D. Marino 
(Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 2003) 139-50. 
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pretending to talk about things that interest the1n, only to switch in 
the end to talking about what interests him. 
One final example that deserves mention is the parable the 
prophet Nathan tells King David in 2 San1uel 11:2-12:15.38 Kierke­
gaard discusses this passage at some length in For Self-Examination, 
where, following his customary practice, he retells the story for his 
own purposes (FSE, 37-39). We can summarize his rendition as 
follows. The narrative begins with King David's committing 
adultery with Bathsheba and subsequently having her husband 
murdered. Nathan learns of David's misdeeds and desires to get the 
umepentant king to acknowledge the error of his ways. But Nathan 
does not proceed straightforwardly. Instead, he approaches David 
with a little story he has written so that the king," a connoisseur, an 
expert in matters of taste," can judge it: 
"There lived two men in a certain city. The one was very rich and had 
great herds of livestock, large and small, but the poor man had only a little 
lamb that he had bought and raised and that had grown up with him to­
gether with his childi-en. It ate from his hand and drank from his cup, and 
it was like a child in his home. But when a traveler came to the rich man, 
he spared his livestock, large and small, and took the poor man's sheep, 
slaughtered it, and prepared it for the stranger who had come to him." (FSE, 38) 
David listens to the story and makes some comments about its 
structure and style. Then, suddenly, with David still caught up in the 
aesthetic aspects of the story, Nathan changes his tone: "Thou art the 
man." The transition has its desired effect; David sees the error of his 
ways and repents (cf. CD, 235-36). Conclusion Regarding the Indispensability Thesis 
We can now take stock of this second argun1ent for the indis­
pensability thesis. We have established two things. First, the use of 
direct co111munication to help people out of self-deception faces a 
serious obstacle. Second, indirect communication provides a way 
around this obstacle. That is not to say indirection is infallible, nor 
�e Pattison, "The Theory and Practice of Language and Communication," 86-
87.
The Point of View 323 does Kierkegaard suggest as much (PV, 49). The point is just that in­direct co1nmunication can avoid a serious difficulty that plagues direct communication.· Are these two points strong enough to support Kierkegaard's indispensability thesis? To recall, the indispensability thesis states that indirect communication can accomplish some task that direct communication simply cannot. For this thesis to hold, direct communication must necessarily or inevitably fail at the task in question. To wit, it must necessarily or inevitably fail at removing self-deception. We have seen that Kierkegaard makes a claim to this effect (PV, 43). But does the evidence at hand support it? I believe it does not. Let me explain why. Kierkegaard's account reveals that the obstacle facing direct communication stems from a conflict of desires. The audience wants the opposite of what the direct communicator wants. In particular, it wants to obscure the truth that the direct communicator wants to bring to light. But why should we believe that the audience will necessarily or inevitably win this conflict? Why should we believe that, just because the audience wants the direct communicator to fail, he or she will fail? For all we know there are cases where, perhaps simply out of dogged perseverance, the direct communicator succeeds at 1naking the audience aware of the truth even though the audience does not want to be made aware of it. Of course, it 1night turn out that there are no such cases. It might turn out that, just as a matter of brute fact., the audience always triu1nphs. But that is not something Kierkegaard or anyone else can establish a priori. Now we do have a posteriori evidence that speaks against the efficacy of direct communication when it comes to removing self­deception. History furnishes us with no shortage of examples here. However, even if we were to discover that every previous attempt at direct communication had failed at this task, we still would not have a strong enough case for the indispensability thesis. We still could not rule out the possibility that these failures occurred because the direct communicator gave up too soon. Moreover, we could not rule out the possibility that the tide would turn in favor of direct communication in the future. As long as these possibilities remain in play, we strictly speaking cannot conclude that the failure of direct comn1.unication is necessary or inevitable. In conclusion, the considerations explored in the second half of 
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this paper do not support the indispensability thesis. Still we must 
take care less we overstate the point. Two qualifications are worth 
mentioning in particular. First, our investigation has not shown that 
the indispensability thesis is false, only that the specific reasons 
Kierkegaard offers us in the Point of View do not establish its truth. 
The possibility of proving the thesis on other grounds remains open. 
Second, the results of our investigation do not entail that indirect 
com1nunication is useless. On the contrary, we have seen that indirect 
communication is a very fruitful strategy for removing self­
deception. Indeed it is far superior to the direct approach. The 
problem is just that the indispensability thesis sets a higher bar. It 
states that indirect communication provides the only way to 
accomplish some task, not just the best way to do so. Nothing we 
have examined in this paper supports a claim quite this strong. 
